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RECENT DECISIONS

addition, section 2(a) is directed to the protection of primary-line,
secondary-line and tertiary-line competition2 7 while section 2 (b) is confined in scope to primary-line competition-actual competitors of the
discriminating seller.28
It is clear that the majority opinion discharged the Court's responsibility to effect the legislative intent.. Thus, the Robinson-Patman funeral
procession signalled in the Fifth Circuit was halted and new life restored
to the Act. The Commission's construction adopted by the Supreme
Court in this case is the only one warranted by the purpose of the Act.
The basic underlying policy of all anti-trust legislation is the preservation of competition. The Court's decision here is consistent with that
policy.
Andrew M. Schifino

SALEs-Uniform Commercial Code-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
completely ignored the Uniform Commercial Code in a case where the
Code was applicable.
C.I.T. Corp. v. lonnet, 419 Pa. 435, 214 A.2d 620 (1965).
In 1961, the Commercial Appliance Company sold equipment to Miracle
Lanes, Inc. under a conditional sales contract.1 The Commercial Appliance
Company then assigned its rights under the contract to the C.I.T. Corporation, which had financed the transaction.
In 1964, Miracle Lanes, Inc. assigned the lease for a cocktail lounge,
where the equipment was located, to Penn Hills Center, Inc. The plaintiff,
C.I.T. Corporation, through its authorized agent, was informed of and
consented to the assignment with full knowledge that the payments
would thereafter be made by the assignee, Penn Hills Center, Inc. When
the installment payments ceased, the C.I.T. Corporation brought an
action in assumpsit against the defendants, Miracle Lanes and Mr. Jonnet.
The defendants alleged that through the circumstances surrounding the
assignment they were released from further liability on the original
contract.
The lower court granted a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the
plaintiff. The defendants appealed, contending that the evidence of a subsequent parol agreement was sufficient to raise the issue of modification
of the original contract.
27. 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1936).

28. See, Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
1. Elmer J. Jonnet, Jr. guaranteed in writing, as a surety, Miracle Lanes' obligations
under the contract.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in affirming, stated that a provision
of the original contract presented an insurmountable barrier to the defendants. The provision read "no waiver or change in this contract or
related note, shall bind such assignee (in this case, the plaintiff) unless in
writing signed by one of its officers." 2 The court required the allegation
of cancellation of this condition prior to any consideration of the oral
modification.
The defendants cited Kirk v. Brentwood M. H. Inc.,3 in which the
superior court said "Even where the written contract prohibits a nonwritten modification, it may be modified by subsequent oral agreement."
The supreme court said, however, that the Kirk case must be read in
connection with Wagner v. Graziano Construction Co.,4 which required
a proper allegation of waiver of the contractual provision prior to considering the effect of the parol agreement. The court concluded, therefore,
that "the mere statement that the lease had been assigned to another
and that the plaintiff's agent was apprised of this and payments had been
made by the assignee did not indicate any waiver of the contractual
provision in controversy. '
This explanation, however, is marred by dictum in the Wagner case.
In that case Justice Musmanno said "even where the contract specifically
states that no non-written modification will be recognized, the parties
may yet alter their agreement by parol negotiation." 6 The fact that there
was a waiver in the Wagner case does not effectively explain this statement and when this language is considered in connection with the decision
in C.I.T. Corp. v. lonnet, which never mentions the dictum in the Wagner
case, the net result is confusion. It is indeed unfortunate that the court
created confusion instead of removing some of that which already surrounds the Uniform Commercial Code.
The C.I.T. case presented an excellent opportunity for the court to
interpret section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code. This section
was brought to the court's attention by the appellees7 but, without
explanation, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania apparently ignored this
Pennsylvania statute which was clearly applicable. Through its applicaiton the court would necessarily have interpreted it. A reading of the
statute cleary demonstrates its need for explanation. Section 2-209(2)
provides that "a signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded,
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

C.I.T. Corp. v. Jonnet, 419 Pa. 435, 438, 214 A.2d 620, 622 (1965).
191 Pa. Super. 488, 492, 159 A.2d 48, 50 (1960).
390 Pa. 445, 136 A.2d 82 (1957).
C.I.T. Corp. v. Jonnet, supra note 2, at 439, 214 A.2d at 622.
Wagner v. Graziano Construction Co., supra note 4, at 448, 136 A.2d at 84.
See, Brief for Appellee.
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. . . while section 2-209(4) states "although an attempt at modification
or rescission does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3)
[statute of frauds] it can operate as a waiver." 9 Dean Hawkland has
attempted to explain the effect of section (4) upon section (2), and in
discussing section (4) he states:
The key term of this provision namely, "waiver," is not defined
by the U.C.C. As used in subsection 2-209 (5), however, it seems
equivalent to estoppel. If 'waiver' means "estoppel" as it Is
used in section 2-209, the no-modification-unless-in-writing
clause would be safe in all cases except those in which the party
with the protected right had given it up, and the other party
had changed his position in reliance thereon.'0
Dean Hawkland then uses section 1-107" as support for stating that "an
effective waiver . . . must be either written or supported by consideration."' 2 Others, however, do not interpret section 1-107 as justifying
8
this statement.
This discussion merely demonstrates the problems that only judicial
construction can solve. Justice Musmanno could have used the Wagner
case, although not a Code case, as a vehicle to discuss, analogously, the
effect of section 2-209. This action would have been commendable, for
the application of a previously interpreted section, then, would have
facilitated the C.I.T. decision. Having declined to discuss the Code in
Wagner, however, Justice Musmanno was presented with an opportunity
to apply the Code directly in the C.I.T. case. C.I.T. was decided without
mention of the Code. It is unfortunate that a case which could have removed some confusion left in its wake more than it originally found.
Frank A. Mysliwiec
tit. 12A, § 2-209(2) (Supp. 1964).
9. PA. STAT. AwNx. tit. 12A, § 2-209(4) (Supp. 1964).
10. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUm
TO THE UNIFORM COMMT&ERCIAL CODE 162
(1964).
11. § 1-107 Waiver or Renunciation of Claim or Right After Breach
Any claim or right arising out of an alleged breach can be discharged in whole or in
part without consideration by a written waiver or renunciation signed and delivered by the
aggrieved party. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-107 (Supp. 1964).
This section has never been judicially interpreted.
12. Op. cit. supra note 10.
13. N.Y.L. REv. Comm. REP. ON U.C.C. 647 (1955).
8. PA. STAT. ANN.

